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AN ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION MODEL OF LITIGATION

Keith N. Hylton ∗

Abstract
This paper presents a cradle-to-grave model of tort liability, incorporating the
decision to comply with the due-care standard, the decision to file suit, and the decision to
settle. I use the model primarily to examine settlement rates, plaintiff win rates, and
compliance with the due-care standard. The key results of the model are as follows: (1)
litigation to judgment occurs only when some but not all actors comply with the due-care
standard, and (2) if defendants have the information advantage at trial, plaintiff win rates
generally will be less than fifty percent. I apply the model and its simulation results to
several empirical issues in the litigation literature. The model simulation indicates that the
British rule for allocating legal costs is superior to alternatives in terms of social welfare.
In addition, the model is capable of explaining several empirical features of litigation and
puzzles in the literature on trial outcomes.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents a model of the liability system that incorporates the decision to
comply with the legal standard, to bring suit, and to settle a dispute. The model assumes
defendants have an informational advantage in litigation; specifically, the defendant knows
whether or not he violated the due-care standard and the plaintiff does not know.
I use the model primarily to examine when disputes will be settled or litigated to
judgment. In particular, I examine three issues. First, what is the connection between
compliance rates and trial outcomes? Will victims bring suit in an equilibrium in which all
potential injurers are complying with the due-care standard, and if so, will the suits be
pursued to judgment? Will victims bring suit in an equilibrium in which no potential
injurers are complying with the due-care standard? I show that victims will continue to
bring suit in either case, but that their claims will be settled. Indeed, litigation to judgment
occurs only in equilibria in which some but not all actors comply with the due-care
standard.
Second, what factors determine the likelihood that a dispute will be settled? The
standard approach to this question, the Landes-Posner-Gould (LPG) model,1 suggests that
litigation is less likely as litigation expenses increase and as the litigation stakes (the
difference between what the plaintiff expects to receive and what the defendant thinks the
plaintiff will receive) fall. In this model, the costs-stakes comparison is only one of several
factors influencing the decision to settle. The probability of settlement is also influenced
by the rate of compliance and by the strategic decisions of litigants.

1

See Landes (1971), Posner (1973), and Gould (1973).

2

Third, what should one expect of plaintiff win rates? The famous and controversial
Priest-Klein analysis suggested plaintiff win rates should be fifty percent.2 Recent articles
have shown that when information is asymmetric among litigants, plaintiff win rates of
fifty percent are unlikely.3 This paper extends this line of research by yielding a stronger
result: if defendants have the informational advantage, plaintiff win rates generally will be
less than fifty percent.
The model in this paper has several implications for empirical results and
controversies in the litigation literature.

A recent spate of empirical papers tries to

determine whether asymmetric-information or divergent-expectations (Priest-Klein)
theories provide a better account of trial outcomes.4 However, in order to evaluate these
two general theories, it is important to develop them further in order to generate as many
testable implications as possible.
The main result here regarding plaintiff win rates is consistent with empirical
evidence.5 Medical malpractice, product liability, employment discrimination, antitrust,
and several other areas of litigation consistently exhibit plaintiff win rates well below fifty
percent.6

The implications of this model are considerably easier to reconcile with

empirical studies of litigation in these areas than those of the divergent-expectations
theory.
I use the model to examine the implications of court bias for plaintiff win rate
statistics. The model shows that the relationship between changes in the plaintiff win rate
2

More precisely, the Priest-Klein theorem predicts fifty-percent win rates when the perceived amount at
stake is the same for the plaintiff and the defendant.
3
See Shavell (1996), Hylton (1993).
4
Osborne (1999); Waldfogel (1998).
5
Eisenberg (1990); Gross and Syverud (1991).
6
Harvard Medical Practice Study, 1990; Perloff and Rubinfeld, 1987; Eisenberg, 1990; Siegelman and
Donohue, 1995.
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and changes in the probability of judicial error are not as simple as first intuition would
suggest. Consider the probability of an erroneous finding of guilt (type-2 error). An
increase in the probability of type-2 error implies that innocent defendants are more likely
to be found guilty. The common intuition is that this should lead to an increase in the
plaintiff win rate. However, in this model an increase in type-2 error may lead to a
reduction in the plaintiff win rate. If informed guilty defendants settle more frequently in
response to the change, the sample of disputes litigated to judgment will contain a higher
proportion of innocent defendants, possibly resulting in a reduction in the plaintiff win
rate. I use this result to reexamine the judge-jury win rate puzzle identified by Clermont
and Eisenberg (1992).
In addition, this model reconciles some conflicting accounts of the liability system.
It is not hard to find descriptions of the system that suggest that it works somewhat like a
lottery,7 and yet it is well known that lawyers reject a large percentage of claims brought to
their attention by potential plaintiffs.8

It is clear in this model that some evidence

suggesting the litigation process is inaccurate in assessing liability (e.g., a high frequency
of false convictions) is not inconsistent with its performing well as a deterrent mechanism.
Indeed, the settlement process captured by this model exacerbates the tendency toward
false convictions already present in an imperfectly accurate though functional liability
system.
Finally, I apply the model to the fee-shifting question examined in so many law and
economics papers.

The model simulation indicates that the British rule (loser pays)

outperforms all other fee-shifting rules on welfare grounds.

7
8

See Saks (1992), pp. 1154-1168: Localio et al. (1991).
Saks, pp. 1190-92.

The key reason for the
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superiority of the British rule is its effect on compliance. The British rule generates the
highest level of compliance because it maximizes the spread between the expected liability
levels of guilty and innocent defendants.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model and the basic
results. Section III presents applications of the model. Section IV discusses implications
for the literature.

II.

THE MODEL

A. Assumptions
All actors are risk neutral. Victims suffer losses from accidents, the risk of loss can be
reduced by the exercise of precaution by potential injurers, and it is costly for the injurers
to take care.9 Let p = the probability of loss if potential injurers do not take care, p>0; and
q = the probability of loss if injurers do take care, p>q>0. Let the random variable v = the
loss suffered by an accident victim and damages awarded by the court, v>0. I assume v has
the distribution function H, and is observed by all parties once realized. Let the random
variable x = the cost to a potential injurer of taking care, x>0.

I assume x has the

distribution function G, and is unobservable to potential victims. Each injurer, however,
knows his cost of care.
Litigation is costly and courts occasionally make mistakes in deciding liability. Let
Cp = the plaintiff’s (victim’s) cost of litigating, Cp > 0; Cd = the defendant’s (injurer’s) cost
of litigating, Cd > 0. Let Q1 = the probability of type-1 error; i.e., the court erroneously

9

The model in this paper builds on Hylton (1990).
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fails to hold a defendant liable, 0<Q1<1; Q2 = the probability of type-2 error; i.e., the court
erroneously holds a defendant liable, 0<Q2<1. Victims and injurers know Q1 and Q2, and
the courts are sufficiently accurate that
1-Q1 > Q2 .

(1)

The actor violates the due-care standard if he fails to take care when the cost of
taking care is less than the increase in expected loss to the victim; i.e., when x<(p-q)E(v).
In negligence law, this standard is known as the Hand formula.10 However, it can also
serve as a model of a general balancing test similar to those used in most areas of law.11

B. Settlement and Litigation Incentives
Let Pp represent the plaintiff’s rational estimate of the probability of a verdict in his
favor. Because the plaintiff does not know whether the defendant complied with the legal
standard, Pp = W(1-Q1)+(1-W)Q2, where W is the probability, given an injury, that the
injurer did not comply with the due-care standard.
Suit is brought if the plaintiff’s expected judgment, Ppv, exceeds the expected cost
of bringing suit, or, equivalently, v exceeds the threshold v1=Cp/Pp. If this condition does
not hold, the plaintiff’s threat to sue would not be credible, and so the defendant would
refuse to make a positive settlement offer to the plaintiff.
Let Pd be the defendant’s estimate of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff.
Since the defendant knows whether he complied with the legal standard, Pd = 1-Q1 when
10

This formulation of the negligence standard was first stated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F. 2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
11
For example, the Rule of Reason of antitrust requires the court to balance the social benefits against the
social harms caused by a restraint on competition. Indeed, since almost every legal standard involves some
ex post balancing of the costs and benefits of the defendant’s conduct, one could argue that the Hand formula
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the defendant did not comply and Pd = Q2 when the defendant did comply. Thus, if the
defendant is guilty his expected liability is (1-Q1)v+Cd, and if he is innocent his expected
liability is Q2v+Cd.
The non-compliance probability, W, is endogenous. Let E(Lnc) be the expected
liability of a guilty defendant (i.e., one who failed to take care and for whom x < (p-q)E(v))
and E(Lc) be the expected utility of an innocent defendant.12 Applying Bayes’ rule,

pò

( p −q ) E (v )

E ( Lnc ) − E ( Lc )

pò

∞

E ( Lnc ) − E ( Lc )

dG ( x)

dG ( x) + q ò

E ( Lnc ) − E ( Lc )

0

(2)
dG ( x)

I follow Png (1987) in modeling the litigation game, illustrated in figure 1. First, the
plaintiff files (or does not file) suit; second, the defendant makes a settlement offer
(formally, each type of defendant selects a probability distribution over the possible
settlement amounts); third, the plaintiff either accepts or rejects the defendant’s offer;
fourth, the plaintiff, if he rejects, either litigates or drops the action. The main result is the
following:

Proposition 1: (1) Assume W(1-Q1-Q2)v>Cp+Cd. Then there is a mixed strategy
equilibrium, in which two possible offers are observed from guilty defendants: sHg = (1Q1)v-Cp and s* = max {0, Q2v-Cp}. From innocent defendants, the only offers are sHi =
Q2v+Cd and s* = max {0, Q2v-Cp}.
provides a good general description of the vast majority of legal standards. For a similar argument, see
Craswell (1999), at 2217-2219.

7

(a) In particular, if Q2v-Cp < 0, then s* = 0. The innocent defendant offers s* with
probability one, and the probability the guilty defendant offers s* is

γ* = (1-W)(Cp-Q2v)/[W((1-Q1)v-Cp)].

(3)

The probability the plaintiff accepts s* is

θ* = (Cp+Cd)/[(1-Q1)v + Cd].

(4)

(b) If Q2v-Cp > 0, then s* = Q2v-Cp, and the innocent defendant offers s* with
probability one, and the probability the guilty defendant offers s* is

γ** = 0.

(5)

The probability the plaintiff accepts s* is

θ** = (Cp+Cd)/[(1-Q1-Q2)v + Cp + Cd].

(6)

(2) Assume W(1-Q1-Q2)v < Cp+Cd. Then there is a pure pooling equilibrium in which all
disputes settle with both innocent and guilty defendants paying S' = [W(1-Q1)+(1-W)Q2]vCp .
Proof: All proofs are provided in the Appendix.

A few remarks are in order. Note that there are three “thresholds“ suggested by this
model. The first is v1 = Cp/Cd, the level of victim loss at which a lawsuit becomes a breakeven proposition for an uninformed plaintiff. For v < v1 no litigation occurs because no
lawsuits are filed. The second threshold is v2 = (Cp+Cd)/[W(1-Q1-Q2)], which is the level of
loss above which an equilibrium in which litigation occurs becomes feasible. This
corresponds, and is the equivalent in this model, to a more familiar threshold result known
as the Landes-Posner-Gould condition. According to LPG, litigation occurs only when (Pp12

I use “guilty” to refer to a defendant who is liable for breaking the due-care standard; and otherwise I refer

8

Pd)v > Cp+Cd, which is equivalent to W(1-Q1-Q2)> Cp+Cd. The third threshold is v3 =
Cp/Q2, which is the level at which a lawsuit against an innocent defendant breaks even.
When v > v3, guilty defendants no longer attempt to pool with innocents, because if they
pool with any positive probability, plaintiffs will pursue the claim to judgment.
Paradoxically, in this equilibrium separation occurs among the two defendant types
precisely because even the weakest (or frivolous) legal claims are profitable to plaintiffs.

to the defendant as “innocent”.

9
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Figure 1: Case where Q2v – Cp < 0.
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From the foregoing, the expected percentage of disputes that are litigated to
judgment, given an injury, is

(1-H(v2)){WProb(v<v3|v>v2)E(γ*(1-θ*)|v>v2,v<v3)

(7)

+ (1-W)[Prob(v<v3|v>v2)E((1-θ*)|v>v2,v<v3)
+Prob(v>v3|v>v2)E((1-θ**)|v>v2,v>v3)]}.

The following is an important, though straightforward, implication of (7) and
Proposition 1.

Proposition 2: If all potential injurers comply with the due-care standard, or if no
potential injurers comply with the due care standard, no disputes will be litigated to
judgment.

No disputes are litigated to judgment in the extreme cases of full compliance and
total noncompliance because all initial settlement offers are accepted. In the former case,
defendants make low offers equal to Q2v-Cp, which are accepted. In the latter case,
defendants cannot attempt to pool (there are no innocents) because plaintiffs would
respond by pursuing every claim to judgment.

III.

APPLICATIONS
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A. Determinants of the Probability of Settlement

It is useful to compare the implications of this model to those of the common approach
to modeling settlement, the Landes-Posner-Gould (LPG) model. Once suit is filed,
litigation to judgment occurs (or settlement does not occur) in the LPG model when (PpPd)v > Cp+Cd, which suggests that the probability of litigation to judgment (post-filing)
increases as the litigation stakes increase and falls as litigation costs increase.
Equation (7) shows that there are several routes through which a change in
litigation costs or in the factors determining litigant’s expectations influence the
probability that a dispute will be litigated to judgment: first, through altering the litigation
threshold probability 1-H(v2); second, through influencing the strategic incentives of the
parties, which determine γ and θ; third, through altering the equilibrium compliance rate,
1-W; fourth, through altering the threshold probability that v > v3, the point at which
“frivolous” claims become profitable. For simplicity, let us call these, respectively, the
“threshold”, “strategic incentives”, “compliance”, and “frivolous claims” effects.
Consider an intuitive account of these effects. Litigation decreases as the litigation
threshold level v2 increases. The reasoning is at bottom the same as in the LPG model: the
offering party has more to gain from appropriating the settlement surplus rather than
pushing the dispute to the judgment phase. Obviously, litigation increases as the
probability of the guilty defendant making a low offer increases and the probability of a
plaintiff rejecting such an offer increases. An increase in W, other things being equal,
reduces litigation because guilty defendants make the low settlement offer less often than
do the innocent. Finally, a decrease in the frivolous-claims threshold v3 reduces litigation

12

because plaintiffs reject the low offers less frequently in the equilibrium in which
defendant types separate. The implications can be summarized as follows:

Proposition 3: The effect of a change in Q1, Q2, Cp, or Cd depends on four effects:
the threshold effect, the compliance effect, the strategic-incentives effect, and the frivolousclaims effect. The LPG model provides an accurate prediction of settlement incentives only
if the threshold effect dominates or is consistent with the sum of the other effects.

B. Determinants of Trial Outcomes

Empirical studies have demonstrated that plaintiff win rates are consistently below fifty
percent in medical malpractice, product liability, employment discrimination, and several
other areas of litigation.13 This is inconsistent with Priest-Klein model’s prediction of fifty
percent (unless we assume asymmetric stakes). In this section, I show that under the
assumptions of this model, plaintiff win rates below fifty percent are likely to be observed.
I also examine other trial outcome statistics, such as the rate of erroneous findings of
liability, and consider the influence of changes in the likelihood of judicial error on
plaintiff win rates.
1. Trial Outcome Statistics
Let the proportion of guilty defendants who do not settle be βnc. Let the proportion of
innocent defendants who do settle be given by βc. The plaintiff’s win rate at trial is

13

For empirical evidence on plaintiff win rates, see Eisenberg, 1990, Gross and Syverud, 1991, Siegelman
and Donohue, 1995.
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(1 − W ) β c Q2 + Wβ nc (1 − Q1 )
(1 − W ) β c + Wβ nc

π=

(8)

Note that if βnc = βc, the plaintiff’s win rate at trial is equal to Pp, the plaintiff’s estimate of
the probability of a finding of guilt. However, the two numbers differ generally because of
divergent settlement rates across guilty and innocent defendants.14

βc =

∞

max( v2 ,v3 )

*
ò (1 − θ )dH (v) +

v2

ò (1 − θ

**

)dH (v) .

(9)

max( v2 ,v3 )

Further,

βnc =

max( v2 ,v3 )
*

òγ

(1 − θ * )dH (v)

(10)

v2

Define µc = βc, µnc = [W/(1-W)]βnc (for W<1), and α* = [W/(1-W)]γ*. For W<1 the plaintiff
win rate can be expressed:

π=

µ c Q2 + µ nc (1 − Q1 )
,
µ c + µ nc

where

14

Expression (10) is actually the probability of non-settlements, given that a lawsuit has been filed.

(11)

14

µnc =

max( v2 ,v3 )
*

òα

(1 − θ * )dH (v)

(12)

v2

Expressions (11) and (12) have implications for the Priest-Klein prediction of a
fifty-percent plaintiff win rate. If Q1 and Q2 are equal and the coefficients µnc and µc are
also equal, the plaintiff win rate will be fifty percent.15 But µnc and µc are unlikely to be
equal. Note also that α* falls as the ratio of litigation costs to litigation stakes falls (and
thus as v increases). Unless the vast majority of disputes involve stakes that are small, α*
will be less than one. Hence,

Proposition 4: Suppose that the rate of noncompliance (W) is positive and less than
one. As a general rule, µnc < µc. Thus, if the rates of type-1 and type-2 error are equal the
plaintiff win rate generally will be less than fifty percent. However, the win rate may
exceed fifty percent when the stakes are low and the rate of noncompliance is high
(W>1/2).16

The key difference between this model and that of Priest and Klein is that the latter
assumes parties are symmetrically informed with respect to the plaintiff’s likelihood of
winning, while in this model only the defendant knows his true status. Because of
informational asymmetry, guilty defendants settle at higher rates than do innocent; and as a
result, the pool of litigants contains a disproportionately large share of innocent
defendants.

15

Why are the stakes important? As the stakes increase, the defendant’s incentive to
make a low offer on purely strategic grounds decreases (holding the rate of noncompliance constant). It follows that the innocent will make up a larger share of the pool
of defendants who make low settlement offers, which implies a low plaintiff win rate.
Conversely, if the stakes are low relative to the costs of litigation, the incentive to make a
low offer for strategic purposes increases, which leads to a higher share of guilties among
among the pool of defendants who make low settlements offers. As the rate of
noncompliance increases, plaintiffs will be more willing to call the bluff of a guilty
defendant who makes a low offer. Putting these together suggests that win rates may
exceed fifty percent when the stakes are low and the rate of noncompliance is high.
Two other statistics of interest are the proportion of defendants who are innocent
and the proportion of losing defendants who are innocent (false convictions probability).
Defining Prob(I|lose) = the conditional probability of innocence, given a verdict against
the defendant,

Prob(I|lose ) =

(1 − W ) β c Q2
(1 − W ) β c Q2 + Wβ nc (1 − Q1 )

(13)

which is equivalently

Prob(I|lose ) =

15

µ c Q2
.
µ c Q2 + µ nc (1 − Q1 )

(14)

Note that a fifty percent win rate is also observed if 1-Q1=Q2=0.5. But this would violate the accuracy
condition in (1).
16
Proposition 4 is restricted to 0<W<1, because if W=1 or if W = 0 all disputes will settle (see Proposition 2).
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Defining Prob(I|litigate) = the conditional probability of innocence, given the defendant
litigates,

Prob(I|litigate) =

(1 − W ) β c
,
(1 − W ) β c + Wβ nc

(15)

or equivalently
Prob(I|litigate) =

µc
µ c + µ nc

(16)

We can use these expressions to examine posterior rates of false convictions and
false acquittals.

First, because µc > µnc generally, (16) implies that innocents will

(generally) make up more than half of the pool of litigants. Second, (14) implies that
innocents will make up more than half of the pool of losing defendants if (1-Q1)/Q2 <

µc/µnc. Thus, the rate of false convictions can exceed fifty percent. Third, (14) implies that
as [(1-Q1)/Q2](µc/µnc) approaches zero, the probability of false conviction (Prob(I|lose))
approaches one. Thus, two factors account for the frequency of false convictions. One is
accuracy; as the trial process becomes less accurate ((1-Q1)/Q2 falls), the probability of a
false conviction increases. The other is compliance; as the rate of compliance increases (W
approaches zero), the ratio µnc/µc falls to zero, which implies the probability of a false
conviction approaches one.
Another statistic of interest to court observers is the posterior rate of false
acquittals, i.e., the proportion of winning defendants who are in fact guilty, which is given
by

17

Prob(G|win) =

µ nc Q1
µ nc Q1 + µ c (1 − Q2 )

(17)

As a general rule, Prob(G|win) < ½. To see this, note that (18) implies Prob(G|win)
> ½ only if Q1/(1 – Q2) > µc/µnc. But this requires (generally) Q1/(1 – Q2) > 1, which
contradicts the court-accuracy assumption (1). The probability of a false acquittal at trial is
generally less than fifty percent because the selection process tends to screen out guilty
defendants.
Since one goal of this paper is to develop implications that can be used to
empirically test the validity of asymmetric information models relative to divergentexpectations models, it is helpful to consider the differences between these results and the
implications of the Priest-Klein theorem. Note that Prob(I|lose) = Prob(lose|I)(1-W)/
Prob(lose), where Prob(lose) = Prob(lose|I)(1-W) + Prob(lose|G)W. Under the PriestKlein model Prob(lose|I) = Prob(lose|G), and thus, Prob(I|lose) = 1 – W. Hence, in the
Priest-Klein model, the rate of false convictions is equal to the rate of compliance.
Similarly, Prob(G|win) = Prob(win|G)W/Prob(win), where Prob(win) = Prob(win|G)W +
Prob(win|I)(1 – W). Thus, under the Priest-Klein assumptions, Prob(G|win) = W, the rate
of false acquittals equals the rate of noncompliance.17
2. Effects of Changes in Judicial Error Rates
How is the plaintiff win rate affected by changes in the probability of judicial error?
The following equations shed light on this.

18

1
− µ nc
(1 − Q1 − Q2 ) µ c µ nc (ε nc
− ε c1 )
∂π
=
+
∂Q1 µ c + µ nc
( µ c + µ nc ) 2 Q2

µc
(1 − Q1 − Q2 ) µ c µ nc (ε nc2 − ε c2 )
∂π
=
+
∂Q2 µ c + µ nc
( µ c + µ nc ) 2 Q2

(18)

(19)

The effect of an increase in error can be separated into two components. One
reflects the influence of a change in the rate of error holding fixed the probabilities of
litigation for guilty and innocent defendants. The second captures the influence of a
change in the error rate on the probabilities of litigation among guilty and innocent
defendants. Consider for example an increase in the rate of type-1 error. The first term is
negative because an increase in Q1 reduces the win rate of plaintiffs. The second term is
ambiguous and requires a comparison of elasticities of litigation. If the elasticity of
litigation with respect to Q1 for innocent defendants exceeds that for guilty defendants
(εnc1 - εc1 < 0), innocents become a larger proportion of the sample of litigants as Q1
increases, reducing the plaintiff win rate further. On the other hand, if εnc1 - εc1 > 0, the net
effect of an increase in type-1 error is ambiguous. A similar explanation serves for the
case of an increase in type-2 error. Holding fixed probabilities of litigation, an increase in
type-2 error increases the plaintiff win rate because it the rate of false convictions.
However, if an increase in type-2 error increases the proportion of innocents in the sample

17

The Priest-Klein results are observed in this model when error rates are equal, and trial selection occurs so
that the pool of litigating defendants is equally divided between the guilty and the innocent. Technically,
Priest-Klein results are observed when Q1= Q2 and (1-W)βc= Wβnc.

19

of litigating defendants (εnc2 - εc2 < 0), then the net effect of the type-2 error increase
becomes ambiguous.
In this model, a change in the probability of error influences the mix of innocent
and guilty defendants in the sample of litigants by influencing the compliance rate and the
rate at which guilty defendants make low settlement offers. Focusing on the latter, (3) and
(4) imply that
∂γ*/∂Q2 = (∂α*/∂Q2)[(1-W)/W]-(α*/W2)(∂W/∂Q2),

(20)

∂θ*/∂Q2 = 0.

(21)

and

The first term in (20) is negative and the second is negative for 0<W<1.18 Thus,
under the assumptions of this model, one could observe the counterintuitive phenomenon
of an increase in type-2 error leading to a reduction in the plaintiff win rate. The reason this
possibility arises is that as the probability of type-2 error increases, so does the probability
that the plaintiff will have a profitable (and therefore credible) claim against an innocent
defendant. As this latter possibility increases, the guilty defendant’s incentive to pool with
innocent defendants falls.

C. Simulation and Application to Choice Among Litigation Cost Allocation Rules

Figures 2–6 show simulations of the model under alternative litigation cost allocation
rules. The horizontal axis measures the cost of litigation for either plaintiff or defendant as

18

See Hylton 1990; Polinsky and Shavell, 1989.
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a fraction of the average damage judgment (Cp/v, assuming Cp = Cd).19 Consistent with the
theoretical results, the plaintiff win rates are all below fifty percent. Figure 4 suggests that
the proportion of innocent defendants is high – above fifty percent – under each rule for all
of the parameter values.
Since there is by now a cottage industry in studying the relative merits of the British
and American litigation cost allocation rules, it is surprising that no study to date formally
compares alternative fee-shifting rules on overall welfare grounds.20 The model in this
paper permits such a comparison, as shown in the figures below with results under four
litigation cost allocation rules (American, British, Pro-defendant, and Pro-plaintiff).21
Defining welfare as the negative of the sum of injury costs, avoidance costs, and litigation
costs, the simulation results show that the British rule outperforms all others in terms
overall welfare (Figure 6). The four allocation rules all performed in a roughly similar
manner in terms of litigation cost, with the British rule, consistent with earlier analyses,
generating the most litigation.22 The substantial difference between the British rule and the
others in terms of overall welfare is largely attributable to compliance effects, as measured
by the probability of injury (Figure 2). The compliance effects are greater under the
British rule because it maximizes the spread between the expected liability of guilty and
innocent defendants.

19

For the simulations, I used exponential distributions for G and H, with exponential parameters ½ and 1
respectively. I also assumed p = .75, q = .25.
20
For a recent analysis of litigation cost allocation rules that provides an informal welfare comparison, see
Van Wijck & Van Velthoven (2000).
21
Under the Proplaintiff rule, the plaintiff pays his own legal costs only if he loses. Under the Prodefendant
rule, the defendant pays his own costs only if he loses.
22
See, e.g., Shavell (1982).
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IV.

SOME IMPLICATIONS

The model in this paper combines several real-world features, such as costly
litigation, the possibility of legal error, informational asymmetry, and the possibility that a
dispute may settle. In this part I discuss some of the implications of these features for the
literature on compliance and settlement, and for the literature on plaintiff win rates in
litigation.

A. Incentive to Sue and Compliance

The model extends a line of research beginning with Ordover (1978), which showed
that when litigation is costly potential injurers undercomply with the due-care standard.
The reason is that if suit is costly, no individual victim has an incentive to bring suit in a
regime of perfect compliance (or overcompliance) because the expected award is zero.
However, when one introduces judicial error into the model, perfect and overcompliance
equilibria are possible.23

The reason is that when courts mistakenly find parties in

violation of the due-care standard (type-2 judicial error), victims will have incentives to
sue even when compliance is perfect.
The first two propositions in this paper extend this line of research by examining the
mechanics of litigation. Although litigation may occur when all potential injurers are
complying with the due-care standard, no disputes are litigated to judgment. Suits are
filed, but each plaintiff settles for an amount equal to the expected payoff to a plaintiff who

23

Hylton (1990).
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sues an innocent defendant. Similarly, when no one complies with the standard, suits settle
for the expected payoff to a plaintiff who sues a guilty defendant.
In terms of an empirical message, the model illustrates and extends a rather basic
paradox of the litigation process. When judicial error rates are positive, the fraction of
innocent defendants within the sample of those found guilty approaches one as the rate of
compliance approaches one. Thus, as compliance improves the ex post or posterior rate of
false convictions increases, generating complaints about the court system. Of course, this
is not a surprising result, since it is an implication of Bayes’ rule. However, Proposition 1
suggests that this tendency toward false convictions is even more pronounced than implied
by Bayes’ rule, for two reasons. First, the trial selection process tends to filter out guilty
defendants. Second, as the probability of a type-2 judicial error (erroneous conviction)
increases, the fraction of innocent defendants within the sample of litigants increases,
further amplifying the tendency toward high ex post false conviction rates. In short, the
familiar Bayesian testing paradox – applying an imperfect test to a virtually disease-free
population leads to a high rate of false positives – is amplified in the litigation context by
the trial selection process.

B. Understanding Trial Outcomes

This model has implications for the literature on trial selection, and plaintiff win
rates in particular. The model provides a more rigorous foundation for the conjecture that
win rates will be less than fifty percent in regimes in which the legal test requires an
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examination of the defendant’s compliance and the defendant enjoys an informational
advantage (Hylton, 1993a).
Generally, the model suggests that plaintiff win rates are influenced by
informational advantages in litigation and by characteristics that may bias a court’s
decision. However, it is difficult to determine the influence of judicial bias on plaintiff win
rates. To illustrate the difficulties, I consider the model’s implications for two empirical
findings on plaintiff win rates.
a. Judge vs. jury win rate puzzle
Clermont and Eisenberg (1992) report the finding that plaintiff win rates are lower in
product liability and malpractice cases when the dispute is heard by a jury than when it is
heard by a judge. Whether before judge or jury, the win rates reported by Clermont and
Eisenberg are well below fifty percent. This goes against the common intuition that juries
would provide awards to plaintiffs more readily than would judges.
The Clermont and Eisenberg results can be explained by the model in this paper. Low
win rates are observed in product liability and malpractice because these are areas in which
the legal test requires an examination of the defendant’s level of compliance and the
defendant has the informational advantage. The judge-jury win rate differences can also be
explained. If the common intuition that juries tend to side with plaintiffs is correct, then
trying a case in front of a judge is equivalent to reducing the probability of type-2 error.
However, a reduction in type-2 error may not lead to a reduction in the plaintiff win rate, if
as a result of that reduction a larger percentage of the cases heard by the jury involve
innocent defendants.
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What, in this model, would explain a tendency for weaker cases to be heard by juries?
Suppose the pro-plaintiff bias of juries implies that Q2 rises (as a result of bias). This
implies that guilty defendants would make low offers less frequently, which would result
in a larger percentage of innocent defendants going to trial. The reason for this is that as
Q2 increases, the probability that a plaintiff has a profitable claim against an innocent
defendant increases, and as this latter probability increases, the guilty defendant’s incentive
to pool falls and innocents become a larger proportion of the defendants going to trial. As
a result, a lower plaintiff win rate would be observed in jury trials.
There are other theories that imply plaintiff win rates will be less than fifty percent,24
and therefore could be used to explain the Clermont and Eisenberg result. For example,
Priest and Klein (1984) and Perloff and Rubinfeld (1987) suggest that if defendants have
more at stake than plaintiffs, they will spend more on litigation. Because the stakes are
asymmetric, plaintiff win rates below fifty percent will be observed. However, this thesis is
hard to reconcile with the Clermont and Eisenberg findings because defendants would have
the same incentive to outspend plaintiffs whether before a judge or a jury. Another theory
that explains win rates below fifty percent is provided by Nalebuff (1987), which argues
that plaintiffs make high settlement demands in order to maintain credibility. However, the
Nalebuff theory is also hard to reconcile with them Clermont and Eisenberg result. A
reduction in the probability of type-2 error should, in Nalebuff’s model, cause plaintiffs to
raise their demands in order to maintain credibility, which in turn would increase the
percent of weak cases, further reducing the plaintiff win rate.
Relying in part on Gay, Grace, Kale, and Noe (1989), Clermont and Eisenberg explain
the judge-jury win rate difference as the result of a process in which uninformed plaintiffs
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with stronger cases choose judges. This is a plausible explanation but it has a key
weakness: if plaintiffs have the informational advantage, one should observe win rates
greater than fifty percent rather than less.
b. Pro-cyclical employment discrimination win rates
As a second example from the empirical literature, consider the finding that the
plaintiff win rates of employment discrimination cases filed during recession are lower
than those filed when the economy is strong (Siegelman and Donohue, 1995). Siegelman
and Donohue argue that this is hard to reconcile with the Priest-Klein model. Under the
Priest-Klein model, the plaintiff win rate should remain fifty percent, unless differences in
perceived stakes vary over the business cycle.
The Siegelman-Donohue finding is consistent with the model of this paper. During
recessions, W, the probability of guilt (discrimination) given injury (job termination) falls
because more terminations are brought on by business conditions. In this model, a fall in
the probability of guilt given an injury generally implies a reduction in the plaintiff win
rate.25 Unlike the Priest-Klein theory, the selection process in this model does not sever
the relationship between the probability of guilt and the win rate.
Siegelman and Donohue argue that during recessions, expected damages increase
because the back-pay award is linked to the plaintiff’s duration of unemployment. As a
consequence, plaintiffs are willing to bring weaker (low probability-of-success) cases to
court. The plaintiff win rate falls, according to Siegelman and Donohue, because the
Priest-Klein selection process does not work perfectly. Although they interpret their

24

For a survey and critique of alternative theories, see Hylton, 1993a.
This point is illustrated by the model simulation results. Intuitively, as the non-compliance rate increases,
we have more guilty defendants in court, unless countervailing selection effects dominate (which is unlikely,
as suggested by the simulation results).
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results as supporting a modified version of the Priest-Klein model, I view their results as
rejecting Priest-Klein, in so far as it applies to employment discrimination cases, and
providing support for the asymmetric information model.

V.

CONCLUSION

This paper presents a cradle-to-grave model of tort liability, incorporating the
decision to comply with the due-care standard, the decision to file suit, and the decision to
settle. The major implications of the model are as follows: (1) litigation to judgment occurs
only in equilibria which some but not all actors comply with the due-care standard, and (2)
if defendants have the information advantage at trial, plaintiff win rates will generally be
less than fifty percent. A simulation of the model indicates that the British rule for
allocating legal costs is superior to alternatives in terms of social welfare. In addition to
these implications, the model is capable of explaining several empirical puzzles in the
literature on trial outcomes.
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APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 1: The proof follows Png (1987). Let the probability
distributions over settlement amounts selected by the guilty and innocent defendants be
given by δnc(s) and δc(s) respectively. For the innocent defendant, δc(s) = 0 for s>shi = Q2v
+ Cd. The reason is that the innocent defendant will lose no more than Q2v + Cd at trial;
therefore, he will offer no more than this as settlement. For the guilty defendant, δnc(s) = 0
for s > (1-Q1)v – Cp. Further, δnc(s) = 0 in equilibrium for s >Q2v + Cd except at sHg = (1Q1)v – Cp. The reason is that the guilty defendant will not lose more than (1-Q1)v + Cd at
trial. If he were to offer a settlement greater than Q2v + Cd, he would reveal his type. But
any offer less than (1-Q1)v – Cp would be rejected, given that he’s been revealed. Thus, if
he reveals his type, he will offer sHg = (1-Q1)v – Cp.
Derivation of mixed strategy equilibrium: first, consider the case where Q2v – Cp
<0. Let γ* = the probability defendant makes offer s* lower than sHg and no greater than sHi.
Let θ* be the probability plaintiff accepts s*. In the proposed equilibrium, the negligent
defendant is indifferent between making sHg and s*, so

(A1)

sHg = θ* s* + (1 - θ*)LH

or
(A2)

θ* =

Cd + C p
(1 − Q1 )v + C d − s *
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The indifference condition for the plaintiff is:

z(1-Q1)v + (1-z)Q2v – Cp = S*

(A3)
which yields

s * + C p − Q2 v
1−W
γ =
W ((1 − Q1 )v + C d − s * )
*

(A4)

Given θ*, we solve for the value of s* that minimizes the expected loss of the innocent
defendant
L(s*) = θ* s* + (1 - θ*)(Q2v + Cd).

(A5)
Differentiating,

L' ( s * ) =

(A6)

(C d + C p )(1 − Q1 − Q2 )v
((1 − Q1 )v + C d − s * ) 2

which, increasing in s*, implies that the innocent defendant will prefer the lowest
acceptable s*, which is s* = 0. The expected loss to the guilty defendant is γ* [θ*s* + (1-

θ*)((1-Q1)v + Cd)] + (1 - γ*)(sHg) = sHg, which is independent of s*. It follows that s* = 0 in
equilibrium.
Now suppose Q2v - Cp > 0. We have the same model, except that the plaintiff will
reject any settlement offer less than Q2v - Cp. Since Q2v - Cp < Q2v + Cd, the innocent
defendant has no incentive to make an offer less than Q2v - Cp. It follows that s* = Q2v Cp .
Under passive conjectures, an offer s’ lower than sHg but greater than s* is assumed
to occur more or less by accident, so that it reveals no new information about the
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defendant. Suppose plaintiff gets an offer s’ where Q2v - Cp < s’ ≤ Q2v + Cd. Under
passive conjectures, the plaintiff will reject such an offer if
W(1 – Q1)v + (1-W)Q2v – Cp > Q2v + Cd

(A7)
or

W(1 – Q1 – Q2)v > Cp + Cd

(A8)

Thus, the guilty defendant cannot gain by making such an offer (if plaintiff gets s’ < Q2v Cp he will clearly reject as he is better off suing).
Suppose
W(1 – Q1)v + (1-W)Q2v – Cp < Q2v + Cd,

(A9)

then plaintiff is willing to accept s’ where
W(1 – Q1)v + (1-W)Q2v – Cp < s’ < Q2v + Cd.

(A10)

Is the innocent defendant willing to offer s’? Yes, and so is the guilty defendant. But the
innocent will clearly prefer s’ = Q2v - Cp, which might be rejected. The minimum offer that
will be accepted is therefore s’ = W(1 – Q1)v + (1-W)Q2v – Cp.

Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose all potential injurers comply, so that W = 0. Then
it follows from statement (2) of Proposition 1 that all disputes will settle with a payment of
Q2v - Cp to the plaintiff. Suppose no potential injurers comply, so W = 1. If (1 – Q1 – Q2)v
< Cp + Cd, it follows from Proposition 1 that all disputes will settle (again, see the second
statement). If (1 – Q1 – Q2)v > Cp + Cd, then (3) implies γ* = 0 (recall W=1), hence no
disputes are litigated.
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Proof of Proposition 3: Consider an increase in the defendant’s cost of litigating
Cd. The LPG model implies such an increase would reduce the probability of litigation.
The derivative of the litigation threshold probability 1-H(v2) with respect to Cd is –
h(v2)/[W(1-Q1-Q2)] < 0; thus, the “threshold effect” is, as expected, consistent with the
LPG model. However, the other influences must be considered.
To simplify the argument, let Ψ equal the probability of litigation to judgment,
whose full expression is set out in (7). Differentiating Ψ with respect to Cd, we have

(A11)

- h(v2)(∂v2/∂Cd)(ψ)

(A12)

+ (1-H(v2)){(∂W/∂Cd)[Prob(v < v3|v > v2)( E(γ*(1-θ*)|v > v2, v < v3)
- E((1-θ*)|v > v2, v < v3)) - Prob(v > v3|v > v2)( E((1-θ**)|v > v2, v < v3)]}

(A13)

+ (1- H(v2)){(∂Prob(v < v3|v > v2)/∂Cd)[W E(γ*(1-θ*)|v > v2)
+ (1-W) E((1-θ*)|v > v2, v < v3)]
+(1-W)(∂Prob(v > v3|v > v2)/∂Cd)E((1-θ**)|v > v2, v < v3)]}

(A14)

+ (1- H(v2)){WProb(v < v3|v > v2)∂E(γ*(1-θ*)|v > v2)/∂Cd
+(1-W)[Prob(v < v3|v > v2)∂E((1-θ*)|v > v2, v < v3)/∂Cd
+ Prob(v > v3|v > v2)∂E((1-θ**)|v > v2, v > v3)] /∂Cd }.

The first line (A11) is the threshold effect, which is unambiguously negative (consistent
with the LPG model). The second line (A12) captures the “compliance effect”, which is
positive, increasing the likelihood of litigation. The third line (A13) captures the “frivolous
claims effect”, and is negative because an increase in Cd makes it more likely that a claim
that survives the first threshold is one which is profitable against an innocent defendant.
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The fourth line (A14) captures the “strategic effect”, and is negative because an increase in
Cd makes it more likely that the plaintiff will accept the low settlement offer from the
defendant.

The LPG model yields accurate predictions in this instance only if the

threshold, strategic-incentives, and frivolous-claims effects overwhelm the compliance
effect.

Proof of proposition 4: I must show that (1-W)/W >ºβnc/βc generally holds. This is
equivalent to:

max( v2 ,v3 )
*

(A15)

1−W
>
W

òγ

(1 − θ * )dH

v2
max( v2 ,v3 )

ò

∞

(1 − θ * )dH +

v2

ò (1 − θ

**

)dH

max( v2 , v3 )

which clearly holds for W≤ ½. Consider W > ½. The inequality A15 is equivalent to:

max( v 2 ,v3 )
*

(A16)

1>

òα

v2
max( v2 , v3 )

ò

v2

For this to be true, it is sufficient that:

(1 − θ * )dH

(1 − θ * )dH +

∞

ò (1 − θ

max( v 2 ,v3 )

**

)dH
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max( v2 , v3 )
*

1>

(A17)

òα

(1 − θ * )dH

v2

max( v2 , v3 )

ò (1 − θ

*

)dH

v2

The shape of α* is given in Figure A1 below:

α* = 1

v
Cp
(1− Q1 )

v3

2Cp
(1− Q1 + Q2 )

Figure A1
We need concern ourselves only with v in the range Cp / (1 – Q1) < v <v3. When v = 2Cp /
(1 – Q1 + Q2), α* = 1. For v > 2Cp / (1 – Q1 + Q2), α* < 1, so (A17) holds. Litigation to
judgment does not occur if v < v2, where v2 = (Cd + Cp)/W(1 – Q1 + Q2). Thus, if (Cd +
Cp)/W(1 – Q1 + Q2) > 2Cp/(1 – Q1 + Q2), then (A17) holds. If (Cd + Cp)/W(1 – Q1 + Q2) <
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2Cp/(1 – Q1 + Q2) then (A17) may not hold. The answer depends on a comparison of the
shaded areas shown in figure A1, weighted by the probability masses under the density h.
If virtually all of the mass is between (Cd + Cp) /W(1 – Q1 + Q2) and 2Cp / (1 – Q1 + Q2)
(i.e., low stakes cases) then (A17) may not hold, but this will happen only in the case of a
very peculiar probability density function.
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